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Abstract 
 
The radical deregulation of financial markets after the 1970s was a precondition for the 
explosion in size, complexity, volatility and degree of global integration of financial 
markets in the past three decades. It therefore contributed to the severity and breadth of 
the recent global financial crisis. It is not likely that deregulation would have been so 
extreme and the crisis so threatening had most financial economists adopted Keynes-
Minsky financial market theory, which concludes that unregulated financial markets are 
inherently unstable and dangerous. Instead, they argued that neoclassical efficient 
financial market theories demonstrate that lightly regulated generate optimal security 
prices and risk levels, and prevent booms and crashes. Efficient market theory became 
dominant in spite of the fact that it is a fairly-tale theory based on crudely unrealistic 
assumptions. It could only have been adopted by a profession committed to Milton 
Friedman’s fundamentally flawed positivist methodology, which asserts that the realism 
of assumptions has no bearing on the validity of a theory. Keynes argued persuasively 
that only realistic assumptions can generate realistic theories. Keynes-Minsky theory, 
which is derived from a realistic assumption set, should be the profession’s guide to 
regulation policy.   
 
Key Words: efficient financial market theory; Keynes-Minsky financial theory; 
Friedman's positivism; financial regulation; financial crises. 
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I. Introduction 
 In the aftermath of the financial collapse in the US that began in 1929, it was almost 
universally believed that unregulated financial markets are inherently unstable, vulnerable to 
fraud and manipulation by insiders, and capable of triggering deep economic crises and political 
and social unrest. These economic and political events were compatible with the theories of 
endogenous financial instability created by John Maynard Keynes and augmented by Hyman 
Minsky. To protect the country from financial instability, the US government created a strict 
regulatory system that worked effectively through the 1960s. Economic and financial turbulence 
in the 1970s and early 1980s led to both a paradigm and a policy regime shift. The neoclassical 
theory of ‘efficient’ or ‘perfect’ financial markets and new classical macro theory (which 
assumes that markets always generate full employment) replaced the theoretical visions of 
Keynes and Minsky.1
 Most financial economists argue that lightly regulated financial markets allow individual 
and institutional investors to achieve the maximum return for a given risk level and choose the 
amount of risk that is optimal for them. Such markets also allocate scarce resources to their most 
productive uses, making the real sector of the economy itself more efficient. It would have been 
much harder to enact radical deregulation if the core of the economics profession had opposed 
efficient market theory and supported tight regulation, as they did in the 1950s and 1960s.
 The government, influenced by the belief that efficient financial market 
theory was sanctioned by economic ‘science,’ radically deregulated US financial markets after 
1980.  
2
The economics profession bears more than a little culpability [for the global financial and 
economic crisis]. It provided the models that gave comfort to regulators that markets 
could be self-regulated; that they were efficient and self-correcting. The efficient markets 
hypothesis – the notion that market prices fully revealed all the relevant information – 
ruled the day. Today, not only is our economy in a shambles but so too is the economic 
 In the 
words of Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz:  
                                                 
1 As explained below, there is a distinction in theory between financial market efficiency and optimality. In ordinary 
discourse, the term efficiency often embodies implies both properties.  
2 Government officials also supported deregulation because they received huge campaign contributions from Wall 
Street, and because politicians and top staff members who supported Wall Street’s agenda frequently were rewarded 
with high-paying lobbyist jobs or employment by large financial institutions.   
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paradigm that predominated in the years before the crisis – or at least it should be. 
(Financial Times, “Needed: a new economic paradigm,” August 19, 2010) 
 
 Francis Fukuyama, an advisor to Ronald Reagan and the second George Bush, 
commented on the symbiotic relation between large financial firms and financial economists that 
he believes contributed to the professions’ support of the efficient financial market hypothesis:  
 Wall Street seduced the economics profession not through overt corruption, but by 
aligning the incentives of economists with its own. It very easy for academic economists 
to moved from universities to central banks to hedge funds - a tightly knit world in which 
everyone shared the same views about the self-regulating and beneficial effects of open 
capital markets. The alliance was enormously profitable for everyone: The academics got 
big consulting fees, and Wall Street got legitimacy. And it has kept the system going 
despite the enormous policy failures it has generated, not to exclude the recent crisis. 
(Quoted in Skomarovsky 2011)3
 
 
 Efficient market theory was not universally supported by the profession’s elite. There 
were respected financial economists whose criticism of mainstream theory appeared in first-rank 
economics journals. Some used assumptions of principal-agent conflict, asymmetric information 
and incomplete contracts to undermine to some unspecified degree the conclusion of market 
efficiency. Others relied on behavioral financial theory to demonstrate that various forms of 
psychologically-grounded investor ‘irrationality’ can help explain disappointing empirical tests 
of market efficiency. But neither of these theories is intended by its supporters to be a substitute 
for the vision incorporated in neoclassical financial theory. Rather, they are meant to be 
amendments to it that do not challenge its dominant position in the profession. “The behavioral 
finance literature… simply adopts the neoclassical view with biases added (e.g., overshooting, 
undershooting, framing, etc.” (Findlay and Williams 2008-09, p. 224). Camerer and Lowenstein 
insist that behavioral finance does not seek “a wholesale rejection of the neoclassical approach to 
economics based on utility maximization, equilibrium and efficiency” (2004, p. 1, emphasis 
added). Matthew Rabin, a star in the behaviorist camp, argues that their research program is “not 
only built on the premise that mainstream economic methods are great, but also that most 
mainstream economic assumptions are great” (2002, p. 658, emphasis in original). And, like 
problems of child or spouse abuse, these theoretical disputes were primarily kept ‘within the 
                                                 
3 A softer version of Fukuyama’s thesis can be found in Epstein and Carrick-Hagenbarth 2010. They argue that 
many top financial economists had close and highly remunerative ties to Wall Street firms, and this may have 
affected their public support of radical financial markets deregulation. 
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family’ of mainstream financial economists. Thus, their existence did not erode the public’s 
belief that the profession strongly supported deregulation.  
 The theory of efficient and optimal financial markets appears to nonbelievers to be a 
rather absurd theory because it is based on a long list of grossly unrealistic assumptions that bear 
little relationship to the real-world financial system. Moreover, empirical tests of the theory are 
disappointing. This raises two interesting question: How could a theory built on an assumption 
set that bears no resemblance to real-world markets and has very weak  empirical support 
become so widely accepted by financial economists? And why do financial economists reject the 
much more realistic theories associated with Keynes and Minsky that can explain events such as 
the recent crisis?  
 An important part of the answer to this question resides in the peculiar methodology used 
by most of the economics profession - the theory of positivism as explained and defended by 
Milton Friedman in his famous 1953 essay “The Methodology of Positive Economics.”4
 
 This 
methodology is examined in section 2, where its claim that the realism of assumptions has no 
relevance in judging the validity of a theory is assessed and found wanting. Section 3 critically 
evaluates empirical tests used to defend the theory of optimal financial markets. Section 4 
compares the canonical neoclassical capital asset pricing model with the theory of financial 
markets associated with Keynes and Minsky (KM), and argues that KM theory is a superior 
theory and therefore a much better guide to regulation policy precisely because it is based on 
realistic assumptions. Section 5 presents three examples of how the unrealistic assumptions of 
mainstream theory misled regulators and investors in the recent crisis. The last section offers 
concluding observations.  
2. Friedman’s Positivism and the Dominance of the Theory of Optimal Financial Markets 
 The theory of ideal financial markets has two component parts. The first is the 
assumption that financial markets have perfect informational efficiency; this is the ‘efficient 
market’ hypothesis or EMH per se. The second is the assumption that market prices are optimal 
equilibrium prices set by rational utility- maximizing agents who have perfect information about 
the cash flows associated with all securities.   
                                                 
4 In this paper the term positivism refers specifically to Friedman’s interpretation of the concept.   
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 The EMH asserts that all information relevant to the correct pricing of securities is 
utilized in the pricing process. As Eugene Fama, one of the creators of efficient market theory, 
put it: “I take the market efficiency hypothesis to be the simple statement that security prices 
fully reflect all available information” (1991, p. 1575). Fama observed that “models of market 
equilibrium start with the presumption that markets are efficient” (Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis 2007, emphasis added). Thus, efficiency is neither a derived nor an observable nor a 
directly testable property of financial markets. It is an assumption required to construct optimal 
asset pricing models that conclude that risk and return are appropriately priced.  
 The EMH raises two important questions: what is the ‘relevant’ information set that is 
available to investors; and what does it mean to say that this information is  
‘fully reflected’ in security prices. With respect to the first question, neoclassical financial 
markets theory assumes that the information set available to investors consists of the correct 
expectation of the distribution of future cash flows associated with each security. In other words, 
the theory is built on the assumption that investors, through some miraculous but unspecified 
process, gain perfect knowledge of the future.5
 An answer to the second question requires the specification of a pricing model or theory 
that can be used to convert cash-flow expectations into security prices. Mainstream financial 
market theory posits that all agents use “rational” expectations as input into one of the canonical 
models of optimal security pricing such as the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) or options 
pricing model. The model then generates optimal prices that accurately reflect the risk and return 
associated with all securities.  The perfect financial markets paradigm that has sustained the 
deregulation movement thus consists of the joint hypothesis that the EMH and a canonical theory 
of optimal pricing together explain how markets generate security prices. 
 Through a peculiar twist in language, these 
expectations are called ‘rational’ expectations, even though it would seem to be the height of 
irrationality to assume that that anyone can know the future. However, as discussed below, the 
assumption that all relevant information is used to price securities is not uniquely associated with 
neoclassical theory. In a Keynesian world in which no one can know the future, sensible agents 
would also use all information they deemed relevant to form their expectations, though they 
would have no reason to believe that their expectations were assuredly correct.  
                                                 
5 The theory acknowledges that unforeseen changes in the economy might alter cash flow distributions. However, 
since agents are assumed to act as if they were positive that the current expected cash-flow distributions were 
permanent, this is a distinction without a difference.  
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 There are two serious problems with the mainstream theory of optimal financial security 
pricing. The first is methodological, and deals with the relation between assumptions and 
conclusions or derived hypotheses. The second relates to the empirical evidence used to support 
the theory.  
 Few economists think about methodology, but the methodological foundation of 
neoclassical economics is Milton Friedman’s (1953) version of ‘positivism.’ Positivism asserts 
two important theses. First, neither the extent to which the assumption set of a theory 
incorporates all the core elements of the phenomenon under investigation, nor the institutional or 
behavioral or empirical realism of the assumptions adopted matter in evaluating their validity or 
usefulness. The “relation between the significance of a theory and the “realism” of its 
“assumptions” is almost the opposite of that suggested by [critics of positivism]. Truly important 
and significant hypotheses will be found to have “assumptions” that are wildly inaccurate 
descriptive representations of reality…” (Friedman 1953, p. 14). Second, it is impossible to 
determine whether one assumption is more realistic than another. A theory “cannot be tested by 
comparing its “assumptions” directly with “reality.” Indeed, there is no meaningful way in which 
this can be done” (p. 41). The only legitimate test of a theory, then, is whether its derived 
hypotheses can be used to make predictions that are consistent with relevant data: “The only 
relevant test of the validity of a hypothesis is comparison of its predictions with experience” 
(Friedman 1953, p. 9). Since prediction testing of necessity involves ceteris paribus assumptions, 
in practice the profession relies on econometric hypothesis-testing with past data.  
 Why would an academic profession sanction the use of theories based on crassly 
unrealistic assumptions? It is not an intuitively attractive idea. One suspects that the underlying 
reason is: economists are, in the main, committed to the defense of propositions that cannot be 
generated by models based on realistic assumptions. For example, a long string of unrealistic 
assumptions are necessary to generate the desired conclusion that unregulated financial markets 
perform optimally. Consider the comment by William Sharpe in a seminal article on the CAPM 
that helped win him the Nobel Prize:  
 Needless to say, [the assumptions of the model] are highly restrictive and undoubtedly 
unrealistic assumptions. However, since the proper test of a theory is not the realism of its 
assumptions, but the acceptability of its implications, and since these assumptions imply 
equilibrium conditions which form a major part of classical financial doctrine, it is far from clear 
that this formulation should be rejected…” (1964, p. 434, emphasis added).  
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Of course, classical financial doctrine insists that competitive financial markets are efficient. In 
1970 Sharpe acknowledged that if just one of the many unrealistic assumptions used to create the 
CAPM - that agents could borrow without limit at the risk-free interest rate - is rejected, “the 
theory is in shambles.” He argued that the inclusion of “such aspects of reality are likely to be 
disastrous in terms of the usefulness of the resulting theory” (quoted in Smith 2010, p. 82-83). 
The method used here clearly is to adopt whatever assumptions set is required to generate the 
desired efficient-market conclusion. 
 Milton Friedman was not only an economist; he was an energetic conservative political 
activist as well. His positivist methodological made it possible for conservative economists to 
use an absurd set of assumptions that no one would accept as a reasonable description of real-
world capitalism to generate wide-spread acceptance of the proposition that unregulated 
capitalism is an ideal system. Realistic assumptions lead to theories that show both the strengths 
but also the myriad dangers and failures of unregulated capitalism contained in the historical 
record.  But positivism made possible a ‘scientific’ defense of the proposition that capitalism has 
no dangers and failures. In other words, Friedman’s positivism insulates flawed theories of 
capitalism that cannot explain or predict the actual behavior of capitalism from effective 
criticism.  
 There are numerous problems with Friedman’s methodology, which has little support 
outside the economics profession.6
 Second, by insisting that the only way to evaluate the extent to which a theory 
corresponds with reality is through econometric tests of its derived hypotheses, positivism places 
a stronger burden on the use of econometrics than it can possibly bear. Consider just two 
problems. The first is that in the age of high-powered computers, one can literally run millions of 
econometrics tests on a hypothesis until one or more of these tests deliver an acceptable result. 
Statistical tests of significance used to assess the realism of derived hypotheses have little 
meaning in this environment and opportunities for ‘data mining’ are unlimited. Virtually any 
hypothesis will be found to be statistically significant if enough regressions are run.  
 We mention two. First, if very unrealistic or patently false 
assumptions are adopted, as they often are, and impeccable logic is applied to deduce hypotheses 
from them, these hypotheses cannot - as a matter of logic - be an accurate reflection of reality. It 
was quite an accomplishment for positivism to triumph in spite of its denial of this proposition.  
                                                 
6 For a critical evaluation of positivism, see Caldwell 1994.  
9 
 
 Another problem is that all hypothesis tests combine theoretical propositions with 
empirical proxies for unobservable variables. Neoclassical theory per se has no testable 
propositions. It essentially argues that, in whatever context, agents will optimize. The properties 
of all general functions - production functions, utility functions, and so forth - must be specified 
in order to generate testable propositions. These properties are not an inherent part of the theory. 
Take the case of hypotheses in which unobservable expectations are important. A proxy for 
expectations must be selected before appropriate econometric tests can be conducted. The 
econometrics test is thus a joint hypothesis combining elements of theory with ad hoc 
assumptions about expectation formation not specified in or related to the theory. If the joint 
hypothesis is rejected, this does not mean the theory is ‘wrong’ - and conversely. It could be that 
the theory is ‘right,’ but the ad hoc assumptions are not - and conversely. In the philosophy of 
science this is referred to as the Duhem–Quine thesis, which says that it is impossible to 
adequately test a theoretical proposition in isolation from assumptions not specified within the 
theory. 
 Because of these and other problems, it is extremely difficult to demonstrate solely on the 
basis of econometric tests that one theory is consistent with reality while another is not. This is a 
fatal flaw in Friedman’s methodology because it rejects all tests of validity other than 
'prediction.' It also helps explain why conflicting theories can co-exist. It therefore of the utmost 
importance that economists use all relevant information in theory testing, including not only 
econometrics, but especially the degree of realism and completeness of the theory’s assumption 
set and the ability of the theory to explain historical dynamic processes - such as the recent 
global crisis - endogenously .7
 Positivists claim that it is not possible to distinguish realistic from unrealistic 
assumptions, but this is not persuasive. Consider the assumption of ‘rational’ expectations - the 
belief by rational agents that they have true knowledge of the future. This is clearly absurd.
   
8
                                                 
7 The proposition that crudely unrealistic assumptions are not inferior to realistic assumptions in theory construction 
must be distinguished from the more reasonable proposition that some degree of abstraction - or approximation of 
reality - is necessary in theory building. The methodological debate, therefore, is not about whether some abstraction 
is necessary, but rather whether or not we should favor theories whose assumptions are not excessively and 
unnecessarily at odds with the reality we wish to theorize.  
 No 
sane economist believes anyone can know with certainty the ‘true’ stochastic distribution of 
8 This assumption involves a logical contradiction. If agents did assume they knew the future, they could not be 
rational agents because there is no logical foundation for this belief. See Crotty 1994 for a defense of this assertion.  
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future cash flows. Yet the ‘rationality’ of expectations is widely accepted because positivism 
sanctions the use of unrealistic assumptions. Economists can assess the realism of the 
assumption set through institutional and historical studies, survey research, experiments, insights 
from psychology and sociology, and basic fact checking. This is hardly a new or an original idea. 
Robert Solow stated that "we have no choice but to take seriously our own direct observations of 
the way economic institutions work...” (1988, p. 311). Tony Lawson argued for devoting "more 
resources into learning about the institutional behaviours, norms, conventions --or, more 
generally, rule systems-- that are produced and reproduced by people in the various spheres of 
activity" (1985, p. 925). Robert Shiller suggested that "we must base further modeling efforts on 
observation and human behavior and on the popular models that inform that behavior" (1992, p. 
435). Keynes insisted that “Our conclusions must be based upon the actual observation of 
markets and business psychology” (1973, p. 149). 
 There is a superior method available to analyze the nature of financial markets and other 
important theoretical issues. Rather than searching for an assumption set that can demonstrate 
that financial markets are efficient, economists should construct a set of realistic assumptions 
about financial markets and ask: what hypotheses about the behavior of financial markets can be 
derived from these assumptions? This theory could then be evaluated using all feasible methods, 
from historical studies to econometrics. This is the method associated with the work of Keynes 
and Minsky.  
 When it comes to methodology, Keynes is the anti-Friedman. Keynes argued that useful 
theories can only be generated by realistic assumptions. Indeed, his most important 
methodological criticism of orthodox macro theory was that it is based on unrealistic 
assumptions and therefore must come to unrealistic conclusions. In the concluding chapter of The 
General Theory he wrote:  
 Our criticism of the accepted classical theory of economics has consisted not so much in 
finding logical flaws in its analysis as in pointing out that its tacit assumptions are 
seldom or never satisfied, with the result that it cannot solve the economic problems of 
the actual world. (1973, p. 378, emphasis added) 
 
 In the Preface to The General Theory Keynes said that the objective of the book is to 
persuade economists to “to re-examine critically certain of their basic assumptions” (1973, p. 
xxi).  The conclusions of classical theory are wrong, he said, because “the postulates of the 
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classical theory are applicable to a special case only,” and “the characteristics of the special case 
assumed by classical theory happen not to be those of the economic society in which we 
actually live” (1973, p. 3) His clear message is that the realism of assumptions does matter: 
conclusions generated from unrealistic assumptions cannot possibly be correct.  
 Perhaps the clearest example of this message is his powerful attack, in The General 
Theory and in his 1937 defense of that book in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, on the 
mainstream assumption that agents know the correct probability distribution of future states of 
the economy. This assumption is a necessary condition for the construction of theories of 
perfect markets. He argued to the contrary that the future is unknowable or uncertain: “there is 
no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever… We simply do not 
know” (1937, p. 214) The replacement of the assumption of “risk” with the assumption of 
“uncertainty” revolutionized our understanding of the nature of financial markets.  
  
 3. Testing the Theory of Optimal Unregulated Financial Markets: Friedman’s Positivism 
in Action 
 There is a large and conflicted literature on econometrics tests of the EMH itself. The 
main problem here is that tests require both the assumption of EMH and the specification of a 
model of equilibrium asset pricing. This makes it impossible to test the EMH by itself.  It “is not 
empirically testable unless some equilibrium model of security returns is specified” (Beaver 
1981, p. 28). As Fama put it: 
“We can only test whether information is properly reflected in prices in the context of a 
pricing model that defines the meaning of “properly.” As a result, when we find anomalous 
evidence on the behavior of returns, the way it should be split between market inefficiency or a 
bad model of market equilibrium is ambiguous.… It is a disappointing fact that, because of the 
joint-hypothesis problem, precise inferences about the market efficiency are likely to remain 
impossible” (Fama 1991, p. 1576, emphasis added).  
 
 The CAPM is a canonical neoclassical theory in which agents trading in perfectly 
competitive markets use the complete and correct information contained in rational expectations 
of future cash flows to determine equilibrium security prices. It assumes the EMH is correct. The 
assumptions used lead inevitably to the conclusion that security prices are optimal because they 
were chosen to do just that. The CAPM demonstrates that all investors will hold the same 
portfolio of securities - the ‘market portfolio’ - that includes all risky securities available plus a 
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risk-free security. It is optimal because asset diversification takes advantage of imperfect 
covariance among security cash-flows to minimize risk at a given return. Less risk-averse 
investors hold proportionately less of the risk-free security and borrow to increase their holdings 
of the market portfolio, raising expected return while increasing portfolio risk.  
It is important to understand that the CAPM is a theory of optimal relative price 
determination. It has nothing to say about the behavior of security price levels, which are the 
focus of concern in theories of financial market instability and in regulation debates. The key 
question for those trying to understand the behavior of financial markets is not whether GM’s 
stock price is correctly in line with GE’s, but why security prices move in boom-bust patterns. 
Larry Summers famously ridiculed the much ballyhooed main finding of the CAPM: “They have 
shown that two-quart bottles of ketchup [risk-adjusted return] invariably sell for twice as much 
as one-quart bottles of ketchup …” (Summers 1985, p 634).  
 It is not difficult to test the derived hypotheses of the CAPM because it has a specific 
assumption about the way in which risk affects the relative prices of securities, and a clear 
definition of risk - the covariance of a security with the market portfolio.9
 However, rather than accept this conclusion, neoclassical financial economists instead 
argued that the CAPM must have failed econometric tests because it defined risk too narrowly. 
This led to a wealth of econometric studies of ‘arbitrage pricing models’ that add numerous and 
sundry additional variables to the risk measure of the CAPM. Since, in contrast to the CAPM, 
arbitrage pricing theory does not define what these other risk factors should be, the entire effort 
appears to be data mining - searching for any plausible variables that might lead to acceptable 
econometric results. There is, in principle, no limit to the extent this search.  
 Empirical tests of the 
CAPM have, for the most part, been disappointing to supporters of neoclassical theory. 
Econometrics tests thus raise serious questions about whether financial markets get even relative 
security prices ‘right.’ In a widely discussed survey of empirical tests of hypotheses derived from 
the CAPM, Fama and French 2004 come to a stunning conclusion: “despite its seductive 
simplicity, the CAPM’s empirical problems probably invalidate its use in applications” (p. 44). 
The tenets of positivism suggest that economists should not accept the CAPM because its derived 
hypotheses do not have convincing econometric confirmation. 
                                                 
9 There is the challenge of finding an empirical proxy for the expected covariance of a security. In practice, the past 
covariance is used as the proxy, which may introduce serious error into the econometric tests. This is an example of 
the Duhem-Quine problem at work.  
13 
 
 There are other widely discussed tests of the theory of optimal financial markets. ‘Event 
tests’ are designed to show that when new information about a company’s profit prospects 
appears in the press, its stock price quickly moves in the appropriate direction. These tests are 
much less impressive than proponents suggest.10
Another important test is whether or not professional investors generally out-perform 
financial markets, which is presumed to be equivalent to asking whether they out-perform 
individual investors. Canonical models assume that everyone has the same information and uses 
the same model to translate that information into security prices. Most empirical studies do find 
that professionals cannot generate greater returns (at the same risk) than amateurs, which is taken 
as confirmation that these assumptions are correct. Important financial economists seem to rely 
on this test more than anything else in their defense of market efficiency. Burton Malkiel stated: 
“For me, the strongest evidence suggesting that markets are generally quite efficient is that 
professionals do not beat the market” (Malkiel 2005, p.2).
 First, there is selection bias in deciding what 
kinds of new information to use in the tests. Events whose effect on stock prices is inconsistent 
with the desired conclusion may be excluded from testing. Second, event studies do not test for 
the size of price movements, only their direction. They therefore cannot be used as evidence that 
stock prices are in equilibrium as required by canonical neoclassical models. Third, virtually any 
theory of financial markets would pass these event tests. For example, KM theory also predicts 
that new information showing that profits were higher than expected would cause stock prices to 
rise. Event tests may provide evidence that market prices react quickly to news, but they are not 
evidence that the neoclassical theory of security pricing is correct. This is a general weakness of 
all econometric tests of canonical models such as the CAPM. They never test whether these 
theories are superior or inferior to alternative theories. In a review of the methodology of 
modern financial market theory, Findley and Williams argued that “in an empirical-positivist 
sense, at best [neoclassical financial market theory’s] implications could not be rejected by the 
available evidence - a test which many opposing models could also pass” (1985, p. 1).  
11
However, even if the pros don’t beat the market, it would not necessarily mean that 
everyone had access to the same information at the same time and used it in the same model. In 
  
                                                 
10 See Glickman 1994 for a general discussion of this problem.  
11 Malkiel’s presumption is that professionals can’t beat the market because security prices always properly 
incorporate complete and correct information about future cash-flows. However, if the future is uncertain and 
unknowable as Keynes insisted, it might still be impossible to beat the market on a consistent basis. Even if pros 
cannot beat the market, this does not imply markets are efficient.  
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the current era professional investors are the market, at least to a first approximation. They hold 
most of the securities and do almost all the trading. So it would be hard for them to outperform 
themselves.12
All these tests reflect the assumption that markets are always in equilibrium. The 
canonical models contain a ‘no arbitrage’ assumption; you can’t find arbitrage opportunities in 
equilibrium pricing models. But the narrative in which the model is embedded contains an 
explanation of why prices remain in equilibrium. If there are excess profits to be made without 
increasing risk because markets are not in equilibrium, professional arbitrageurs will take 
advantage of this opportunity, thereby quickly eliminating out-of-equilibrium profit. For 
example, hedge funds are supposed to excel at relative-price arbitrage. So the justification of the 
‘no arbitrage’ assumption of the CAPM is a posited belief in quick and efficient arbitrage when 
prices are out of equilibrium. This raises the question: why aren’t out-of-equilibrium dynamics 
incorporated in the CAPM? The answer is that modeling disequilibrium processes can destroy 
the desired conclusion that security prices are always optimal, as can be seen in debates over 
‘noise trading’ and ‘rational bubbles,’ Ironically, the ubiquitous arbitrage story also implies that 
many professionals do outperform the market.
 Moreover, tens of millions of individuals pay professional investors large sums of 
money to manage their portfolios. If professionals cannot manage portfolios better than these 
individuals, then this army of individual investors must be irrational. But irrational agents are 
prohibited by assumption in canonical neoclassical financial theory; it is a rational-agent based 
theory. So the finding that pros don’t beat the market implies that a fundamental assumption of 
neoclassical financial theory is incorrect.    
13
Given that mainstream methodology rejects the use of the realism of assumptions as an 
acceptable criterion for testing the validity of a theory, econometric tests must carry the entire 
burden of defense of optimal financial market theory. Since the assumptions used to construct the 
theory and derive its hypotheses are strikingly unrealistic, one would assume that empirical tests 
   
                                                 
12 Shiller offered a related criticism. “Individual investors get advice from professional investors, and they can 
easily observe (albeit with some time lag) what professional investors are doing. So there may be no significant 
difference between the success of professional investors and the market as a whole, even if their analysis is valuable 
to others” (2005, p.180).  
13Shiller also provided a widely accepted critique of the CAPM by testing whether the behavior of stock price 
indices is consistent with their assumed determination by the present value of future market profits. He finds that it 
is not. Stock price indices are far more volatile than the corporate profits that are assumed to determine their value” 
(Shiller 2005, p. 185). 
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would have to pass with flying colors in order to sustain support for the theory and its general 
vision of financial markets. Yet, as in the case of CAPM, mediocre to disappointing empirical 
tests have not led to rejection of its underlying theoretical vision - which is essential to the 
defense of radical deregulation - as it should have under the positivist method, but rather to ever-
changing models of market efficiency. It would seem that the vision captured by the CAPM is 
deeply anchored in an ideological commitment to free markets rather than in disinterested 
scientific study, and that the profession’s commitment to positivism is only skin deep.  
Finally, it is interesting to understand what some important professional defenders of 
financial market efficiency and optimality think about the relation between their theory and the 
nature of real-world security price levels. Burton Malkiel said the following:  
 What I do not argue is that market pricing is always perfect. After the fact, we know that 
markets have made egregious mistakes, as I think occurred during the recent internet 
“bubble.” Nor do I deny that psychological factors influence security prices. But I am 
convinced that Benjamin Graham (1965) was correct in suggesting that while the stock 
market in the short run may be a voting machine, in the long run it is a weighing 
mechanism. True value will win in the end. (2003, pp. 5-6, emphasis added) 
  
 This is an astounding statement. In Malkiel’s opinion, markets generate “egregious” 
pricing errors much of the time and psychological factors strongly influence stock prices, 
something ruled out by assumption in mainstream models. If markets badly misprice securities 
much of the time, real-sector resources are badly allocated much of the time. How inefficient! 
Nevertheless, he tells us we should be comforted by the belief that in the long run, security prices 
will be forced into proper balance with the ability of firms to generate profit. In this context, the 
term ‘long-run’ can only mean at brief periods between booms and busts. Ironically, this belief is 
also embedded in the financial market theories of Keynes, Minsky and Marx. These theorists 
argue that security prices are inherently prone to substantial cyclical and secular volatility. Self-
reinforcing bubbles inevitably occur from time to time; it is crises and panics that bring security 
prices back into temporary equilibrium with cash-flows. Busts are the markets 'long-run' 
equilibrator. Of course, this balance is soon broken by the next bubble or crash. This is a vision 
in fundamental conflict with efficient market theory, which implies that security prices are 
always in harmony with cash-flows, yet Malkiel seems to agree with its conclusion.   
Fischer Black, who helped create the options pricing model, made the following 
observation about absolute pricing efficiency in real-world financial markets. 
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 We might define an efficient market as one in which price is within a factor of 2 of value; 
i.e., the price is more than half of value and less than twice value. By this definition, I 
think almost all markets efficient almost all the time. ‘Almost all’ means at least 90 
percent” (Mehrling 2005, p. 236).   
  
 It is curious, to say the least, that such prominent supporters of the neoclassical theory of 
optimal financial markets believe that real-world security price levels are likely to be much 
higher or much lower than their ‘correct’ values much of the time, and that booms and busts are 
common. Given this belief, they should have been opponents of radical deregulation.  
 
4. The Realism of Assumptions Does Matter: Why the Keynes-Minsky Theory of Financial 
Markets is Superior to Mainstream Theories of Perfect Markets 
Consider the following assumptions used to construct the CAPM. Note that assumptions 
2 and 3 reflect the fact that this is a model of static equilibrium with no dynamic processes and, 
therefore, no endogenous source of movement. 
1. Agents are risk-averse.  
2. The degree of risk-aversion embodied in the utility function is exogenous to the 
model; agents do not become less risk-averse in the boom and more risk-averse in 
a panic because the theory only considers equilibria. 
3. Expectations are exogenous. Agents do not become more optimistic in a boom 
and more pessimistic in a collapse.  
4. Expectations are homogenous - there is no disagreement about future cash-flows 
among agents.  
5. Since this is an equilibrium model with identical information sets, there is no 
trading in the model.   
6. Expectations are correct or ‘rational’ - the statistical distributions of future cash-
flows are known with certainty.14
7. The expected cash-flows from the real sector are exogenous: nothing that happens 
within financial markets affects real-sector cash-flows in the model.
  
15
8.  Future cash-flow expectations are embodied in normal or Gaussian statistical 
distributions.  
 
9. Since prices are always in equilibrium, liquidity is perfect; securities can always 
be sold (without cost) at their equilibrium value.  
10. There is a risk-free security – like a Treasury bill.  
11. Agents can borrow or lend without limit at the risk-free rate of interest.  
12. No one can default.  
                                                 
14 Perfect knowledge implies perfect transparency. This means all agents have perfect information about financial 
products, an assumption badly violated in important financial markets in recent years.  
15Connecting real and financial sectors is a separate task left to macro-economics, but in ‘modern’ macro theory, the 
financial sector is usually represented only by an interest rate.    
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13. There are no financial institutions in the model, only agents holding non-
intermediated portfolios.  
 
With the possible exception of the assumptions that investors are risk-averse and that the 
shortest-term Treasury bills are relatively riskless, this assumption set is a severe distortion of, 
rather than approximation to, reality. These assumptions were chosen because they are 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the conclusion that unregulated financial markets are 
optimal. A profession working with a reasonable methodology and a different ideology would 
have concluded that since the hypothesis that markets are optimal cannot be generated except by 
an absurdly unrealistic assumption set, the hypothesis is quite likely to be wrong.  
 Consider the following assumptions typically used in KM financial theory. Though they 
are abstractions from reality, they are reasonable approximations to it. This theory emphasizes 
endogenous dynamic processes. Assumption 1, the assertion that the future is inherently 
unknowable or uncertain, is a cornerstone of Keynes’s macro theory as well as of his theory of 
financial markets. This assumption set generates a realistic theory of financial market dynamics 
as described in the rest of this section.  
 
1. The future is inherently unknowable. The world is characterized by uncertainty rather 
than calculable risk.  
2. Expectations are endogenous and pro-cyclical. They become more optimistic in booms, 
more pessimistic in downturns, and wildly unstable in panics. 
3. The degree of agent risk aversion is endogenous. Agents become less risk-averse in a 
bubble and more risk-averse in a downturn. 
4. Agents are heterogeneous: they have different expectations,bdifferent degrees of risk 
aversion, and different expectations. Agent heterogeneity is the main reason why there is 
massive daily and hourly trading on security markets.16
5. Financial market decisions affect real-sector outcomes and conversely in an interactive, 
dynamic and path-dependent process. Future cash flows are changed by agents’ financial 
decisions.  
  
6. There is no stable financial market equilibrium, though there are periods of relative stasis.  
Financial market centers of gravity are always being altered by endogenous change in 
expectations and risk aversion, as well as by the creation and spread of real and financial 
innovations.  
7. The degree of liquidity changes over time. There is excessive liquidity in the boom that 
pushes security prices to unsustainable levels, but liquidity evaporates in a crisis, making 
the crisis worse.  
                                                 
16 In 2008, the annual turnover on the New York Stock Exchange was 138%. On average, the entire value of all the 
firms listed on the exchange was sold 1.4 times in 2009.  
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8. Agents cannot borrow without limit at a risk free interest rate. Credit is cheap and widely 
available in a bubble, which accelerates the speed of security price appreciation. 
However, when the bubble ends, credit evaporates and interest rates spike. 
9. Defaults (and therefore counter party risk) exist and are important. Defaults are highly 
counter-cyclical. Fear of default is a major source of downward price pressure in a 
collapse.  
10. Financial institutions strongly affect the performance of financial markets. They are 
complex agents whose incentives, information sets, objectives and constraints differ from 
individual agents.17
   
 
 The economic outcomes we observe over time are generated by a system of ever-
changing agents, agent preferences, expectations, risk-aversion, innovations, and economic, 
political, and social institutions. Thus, the mechanisms that generate future outcomes cannot 
possibly be known in the present. Consider financial innovation. It has qualitatively changed the 
nature of financial markets in recent decades, but future innovations by their very nature cannot 
be known today. Indeed, some future changes are not only unknowable, but unimaginable. Thus, 
real-world agents must make decisions today, such as the capital investment decision and the 
portfolio composition decision, whose outcomes depend on future states of the economy that 
they cannot possibly know. The best agents can do is base their decisions on fallible expectations 
of some kind. These fallible expectations guide agent choice today and thereby influence the 
future trajectory of the economy. “What is imagined for a coming period must, in an ultimate 
sense, help to shape what will, ex post, emerge as the ultimate facts of that period” (Shackle 
1972, p. 440). 
 The assumption of uncertainty raises the interesting question of what it means for agents 
to be ‘rational.’ In neoclassical theory, agents are provided with complete and correct 
information about the future which they can use to make assuredly optimal decisions. This is the 
definition of rationality in neoclassical theory - given complete and correct information, agents 
do the optimization math correctly. But what if agents at best have information about the future 
they know to be incorrect and incomplete? (Strictly speaking, there can be no ‘knowledge’ of the 
future.) How can they make ‘rational decisions’? Neoclassical theory has nothing to say about 
this question because it has assumed it out of existence. However, the main challenge facing 
economists is not to understand why fully informed agents act irrationally (though they may do 
                                                 
17 See Crotty 2010 for an explanation of how perverse compensation incentives in financial institutions contributed 
to the recent financial crisis.    
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so), but rather to understand how sensible agents make decisions under conditions of uncertainty 
or un-knowledge. Crotty 1994 provides a detailed Keynesian answer to the question of ‘sensible’ 
agent choice in uncertain conditions.   
  Since agents are aware that they do not know the future, they can never have complete 
confidence that their expectations will be correct. This means that their decisions will be affected 
both by their forecasts and the degree of confidence they have in the usefulness or validity or 
reliability or truth-content of these forecasts – “on how highly we rate the likelihood of our best 
forecast turning out quite wrong” (Keynes 1973, p. 148). ‘Confidence’ is a psychological and 
potentially unstable variable. 
 In KM theory both expectation and confidence formation are endogenous, changing with 
economic conditions. Agents have no choice but to use heuristics or conventions to forecast the 
future path of security prices and try to estimate their potential volatility or riskiness. Security 
price expectations are formed through extrapolation from the relevant past – unless there are 
strong reasons not to do so. Amromin and Sharpe analyze data on consumer financial market 
expectations to demonstrate that the description of the Keynesian process of conventional 
expectation and confidence formation is the way investors in fact behave. “In forming 
expectations of future returns, household investors appear to extrapolate from recent-years’ 
realized returns. … [E]xpected returns appear to be procycylical” (Amromin and Sharpe 2009, p. 
28). 
 The longer conventionally-determined expectations lead to decisions that generate 
satisfactory outcomes, as they do in booms, the greater the confidence that agents place in them. 
When a financial boom lasts for some time, agents begin to project its continuance. Given 
optimistic expectations of future prices, buying securities previously seen as risky will seem like 
a reasonable decision. As the boom proceeds and optimistic expectations are shown to be 
justified, buying securities with borrowed money will also seem reasonable. This drives the 
financial boom forward, raising leverage while raining capital gains on investors. The heaviest 
rain falls on the most aggressive investors, which leads most agents to believe either that risk is 
objectively low or that risk-taking brings much higher rewards than it used to. Risk-assessment 
and risk-preference are thus endogenous. When risky behavior is being highly rewarded, fear of 
risk declines and conversely.  
20 
 
 Since agents are heterogeneous, trading is active. In the early stages of a boom, 
expectations may differ widely among agents. Bulls will buy securities from bears. But as 
optimism and confidence spread in the boom, bears turn bullish, and the optimistic begin to sell 
to the super-optimistic or least risk-averse.  
 Liquidity rises endogenously in a boom; eventually almost anyone can sell securities for 
more than they paid for them. Leverage rises as well because both borrowers and lenders come 
to believe that leverage is not as risky as it used to be. In recent cycles, the perverse 
compensation system used by key financial institutions rationally induced agents to use 
excessive leverage to boost their bonuses. Interest rates remain low through much of the boom, 
and credit is available even to agents previously considered to be bad credit risks.  
 There is a crucial feedback loop joining the real and financial sectors missing in efficient 
financial market theories. Rising security prices in the boom increase the value of individual and 
institutional agents’ assets and net worth. This increases the amount of debt they believe can 
‘safely’ hold and thus increases their borrowing power just as conventional definitions of 
adequate safety margins become less stringent. Rising use of credit to buy securities leads to yet 
higher prices, which in turn lead to more optimistic expectations held with increasing 
confidence, and higher wealth that can be used as collateral in leveraged security purchases. 
Meanwhile, rising consumer and business wealth and easy and cheap credit lead to increased 
consumption and investment spending. This raises aggregate demand, income, employment and 
profit, which in turn lead to higher actual and expected future cash flows that raise security 
prices.   
 Since every long-term financial boom is accompanied by the widespread belief that we 
have entered a “new era” in which the forces that ended all previous booms are no longer 
operative, the current boom eventually comes to be seen as permanent. A near-universal belief 
develops that high yields previously achievable only by accepting high risk can now be gained 
safely.18
 As Keynes and Minsky stress, market ebullience cannot go on forever. As a boom 
matures, the economy becomes, in Minsky’ famous phrase, “financially fragile.” At some point, 
the economy becomes unable to generate the cash flows needed to sustain euphoria-inflated 
  
                                                 
18 The importance of the “new era” syndrome in the generation of recurrent financial crises is stressed in Reinhart 
and Rogoff 2009. 
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financial asset prices. Profits eventually decline and household income growth slows, leading to 
falling investment and sluggish consumption. As aggregate demand growth slows and 
unemployment rises, agents discover that their expectations were too optimistic and that security 
prices are too high relative to expected future cash flows. Expectations will be revised 
downward, confidence in the accuracy of forecasts will ebb, and security prices will begin to fall. 
Falling asset prices will cause a reverse wealth effect on consumption spending. In a typical 
downturn, falling home prices play an important role in the decline of household wealth. In the 
recent crisis, they were the central force in the process.  
 As financial institutions retrench in the face of rising risk, interest rates rise and defaults - 
assumed out of existence in the CAPM - jump. Fear of higher default rates will cause interest 
rates to rise further and credit for riskier agents to be eliminated. Risk aversion will increase. The 
rising leverage that drove the boom will now be reversed. As the price of at-risk securities falls, 
collateral-calls from lenders will be issued to all who bought now-shaky securities on credit. This 
will lead to the ‘forced sale’ of these securities, which will accelerate their rate of price decline. 
As the market for suspect securities collapses, borrowers will be forced to sell ‘sound’ securities, 
which will spread the crisis across markets. The CAPM assumes that liquidity is perfect and 
costless, but in a financial downturn few agents want to buy suspect financial assets, so they can 
only be sold at fire-sale prices as liquidity evaporates. Watching their own asset values and their 
capital shrink, financial institutions will be less willing to loan to corporations, households or 
each other. In the mid-2000s, intra-financial-market debt was bloated and bank balance sheets 
and off-balance-sheet entities were loaded with excessively risky and nontransparent mortgage-
related loans. This caused frightened banks to stop lending to each other when the boom ended, 
which helped turn the financial downturn into a panic.  
 Both the causes of the recent financial boom and the destructive downward dynamics of 
the subsequent collapse can be explained by KM theory because its assumption set adequately 
reflects the forces that drive financial markets. On the other hand, the assumption set used to 
construct canonical neoclassical financial and macro models makes such endogenous instability 
impossible. If the economics profession had rejected Friedman’s positivism and built its core 
financial models on the realistic assumption used in KM theory, it would have been much harder 
for supporters of radical deregulation to have achieved their objective.  
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5. Three Examples of How the Assumption Set Used in the Neoclassical Model Profoundly 
Misrepresented the Dangers in Financial Markets to Regulators and Market Participants  
a) The Assumption that the Future is Characterized by Knowable ‘Risk’ Rather Than Keynesian 
‘Uncertainty’ Allowed Banks to Become Dangerously Risky with Their Regulators’ Blessing  
Mainstream financial theory assumes that financial products and institutions are perfectly 
transparent. This is a precondition for efficient pricing. In fact, deregulation and financial 
innovation made the portfolios of the giant bank conglomerates that are at the center of the 
global financial system so complex that it became impossible for anyone to make a reliable 
estimate of their risk. In 1998 the Bank for International Settlements sanctioned the idea that 
regulators, who were now incapable of assessing the riskiness of large banks, should shift 
responsibility for setting limits on giant banks’ risk to the banks themselves, who might be better 
informed. Banks were allowed to manage their own risk through a statistical exercise known as 
Value at Risk (VAR). They were, in effect, permitted to set their own capital requirements. Not 
surprisingly, they used this freedom to minimize them. 
VAR is an estimate of the highest possible loss in the value of a portfolio of financial 
assets and liabilities over a fixed time interval with a specific statistical confidence level. 
Mimicking the CAPM and options pricing models, VAR models assume that the probability 
distribution of future security prices is predetermined and knowable - they are characterized by 
risk rather than uncertainty. They also assume that expectations can be adequately represented by 
a ‘normal’ distribution. “All the models in the financial economics edifice assume a normal 
distribution” (Smith 2010, p. 79).  
There are three fundamental flaws in this mode of risk assessment. First, a VAR 
calculation uses historical data to forecast future financial market performance, typically data 
from the past year or less. If this calculation is done in the midst of a boom, the data will reflect 
the ‘perfect calm’ of the period – corporate profits will be high as will capital gains on securities, 
while interest rates, defaults and asset price volatility will be low. The possibility of the outbreak 
of crisis will not be considered because there are no crises in the data base. VAR analysis 
implicitly assumes this ideal environment is permanent. Thus, the risk associated with boom-
induced high leverage and excessively optimistic expectations will be severely under-estimated. 
VAR’s rosy risk-estimates allowed banks to hold dangerously low capital cushions and therefore 
enabled them to use extra leverage to continue to add risky securities to their portfolio. However, 
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even if the data were extended to cover crises in past decades, growth and innovation would have 
changed the system so substantially that there would be little likelihood that the future would 
resemble the past extrapolated.  
Second, while VAR models assume that security price movements conform to the normal 
distribution used in canonical financial models, in fact they follow a distribution in which the 
preponderance of observations are ‘normal,’ but on occasion observations far from the mean 
appear – the well-known ‘fat tail’ phenomenon. The standard exercise calculates VAR under 
negative conditions likely to occur only 5% of the time. In a normal distribution the likelihood 
that an observation several standard deviations beyond a 95% confidence interval will occur is 
infinitesimal.19
Third, the asset-price correlation matrix is a key determinant of measured VAR. The 
lower the correlation among security prices, the lower the portfolio’s risk. VAR models assume 
that asset prices are jointly normally distributed and that future asset price correlations will be 
identical to those of the recent past. However, in crises most prices fall together as all investors 
run for liquidity and safety, creating a high positive correlation and dangerously high risk 
unaccounted for in VAR calculations.  
 Yet tail events inevitably occur from time to time. The use of normal 
distributions allowed banks to assume that serious future crises were impossible. Thus, VAR 
risk estimates let banks minimize required capital and maximize leverage and lending capacity. 
This maximized profits and bonuses in the boom even as it sowed the seeds of a future crisis.  
  
b) Core Neoclassical Models Assume that Leverage is not Dangerous. Belief in these Models 
Contributed to a Cavalier Attitude Debt.   
 The canonical models of optimal financial markets assume that leverage is never 
dangerous because fully-informed agents rationally choose an optimal debt position.  In fact, 
under radical deregulation debt had risen to systemically dangerous levels by 2007. 
 From the mid 1990s until the onset of the crisis, economic growth was largely driven by 
rising household borrowing and the stimulus to consumption provided first by a booming stock 
market and, later, by an enormous increase in housing prices augmented by an explosion in home 
                                                 
19 Taleb states that the assumption that security prices are normally distributed implies that “an episode such as the 
[1987] crash (more than twenty standard deviations) would take place every several billion lifetimes of the universe” 
(2007, p. 274). 
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equity loans. In 1981 household debt was 48% of GDP, while in 2007 it was it was 100%. This 
meant that if job or wage growth slowed, the ability of households to sustain heavy debt loads 
would be compromised. It also meant that if interest rates rose or credit tightened, or if stock or 
housing prices declined, consumption spending and aggregate demand would decelerate, 
threatening job and wage growth. The economy had become extremely financially fragile. 
 Financial firms were also excessively indebted; financial sector debt rose from 22% of 
GDP in 1981 to 117% in late 2008. The spectacular leverage and financial fragility of key 
financial sectors along with the gross overvaluation of the securities they held made a severe 
financial crisis almost inevitable. Excessive household debt and boom-augmented household 
wealth ensured that the real-sector fallout from a financial sector crisis would be severe, but this 
threat was hidden by neoclassical fairy tales about market efficiency. 
 It is estimated that half of the spectacular rise in investment banking return on equity in 
the four years ending in mid 2007 was attributable not to clever investment strategies or even to 
super-heated boom conditions, but simply to higher leverage with higher risk (Financial Times, 
“Worst period for investment banking in 30 years,” April 2, 2008). Moreover, about half the debt 
of the big investment banks consisted of overnight borrowing that would evaporate in a crisis.  
Commercial banks appeared to be adequately capitalized during the boom, but only because a 
high percent of their assets – for some more than half – was kept off-balance-sheet, and the 
prices of all their assets were inflated by the bubble. In fact, banks were dangerously leveraged. 
When the crisis hit, the value of these assets, and therefore of bank capital, plummeted, causing a 
frantic global search for new capital, a spike in interest rates and a tightening of credit standards. 
The initial decline in security prices triggered a de-leveraging process in financial markets in 
which liquidity disappeared. Asset price declines led to margin calls, which led to forced assets 
sales and more margin calls in a dangerous downward spiral.    
 The shrinking availability and rising cost of credit brought on by the crisis, a strong 
negative wealth effect on consumption, and a declining construction industry led to a slowdown 
in economic growth and a rise in unemployment. This is turn, led to lower profits and wages, 
which triggered rising defaults on both business and household loans, especially residential 
mortgages. Real- and financial-sector problems were mutually infectious.   
 Excessive leverage, rising defaults, deteriorating expectations, evaporating liquidity and a 
destructive interaction between the real and financial sectors drove the downturn. These 
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phenomena are integral components of the KM theory of financial market dynamics but are 
invisible in the mainstream financial market narrative about why radical deregulation is the best 
policy.  
 
c) Everyone Acted as if the Theory of Optimal Financial Markets Applied to all Major Financial 
Products, but it Could not Possibly Apply to the Inherently-Nontransparent Securities at the 
Center of the Recent Boom and Bust.  
 Financial innovation has proceeded to the point where important financial products such 
as mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) are so 
complex and so opaque that they are inherently nontransparent. As such, they cannot be traded 
on standard competitive financial markets, but are sold instead through negotiation between the 
originating investment bank and a buyer – “over the counter.” It has been estimated that half of 
all securities are privately traded. Nontransparent securities traded privately cannot possibly 
generate ‘optimal’ prices as defined in mainstream theory.20
 According to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), there 
was $7.4 trillion worth of MBSs outstanding in the first quarter of 2008, more than double the 
amount outstanding in 2001. Over $500 billion dollars in CDOs were issued in both 2006 and 
2007, up from $157 billion as recently as 2004 (SIFMA website). The explosion of complex 
MBSs and derivative products created large profits and bonuses at giant banks and other 
financial institutions, but also destroyed the transparency necessary for any semblance of market 
efficiency. Since these securities were nontransparent, so were the institutions that held them.  
 For this reason alone, no one should 
have put any credence in efficient market theory as a guide to regulatory policy.  
 Exchange-traded securities are sold in highly competitive and transparent markets with 
low profit margins accruing to the market-making institution. Thus, banks had a strong incentive 
to create products so complex that they could not be sold on exchanges at all. By the mid-2000s, 
eighty percent of derivatives were sold over-the-counter in private deals. Such agreements are 
characterized by oligopoly pricing power, asymmetric information and unequal bargaining 
power that allow banks to generate high profit margins.  
                                                 
20 A Financial Times article noted that most of the $600 trillion dollars worth of private or over-the-counter 
derivatives contracts “are rarely if ever traded…” It cited a regulator who said there was one day in 2008 when just  
two trades in credit default swaps caused worldwide market panic (“Raising the curtain on the private nature of 
derivatives,” September 17, 2010).   
26 
 
 Consider the collateralized debt obligation. A mortgage-backed CDO converts the cash 
flows from the mortgages in its domain into tranches or slices with different risk characteristics. 
Several thousand mortgages may go into a single MBS and as many as 150 MBSs can be 
packaged into a single CDO. 
 A textbook on credit derivatives explains that: 
 Even with a mathematical approach to handling correlation, the complexity of calculating 
the expected default payment, which is what is needed to arrive at a CDO price, grows 
exponentially with an increasing number of reference assets [the original mortgages]. … 
As it turns out, it is hard to derive a generalized model or formula that handles this 
complex calculation while still being practical to use. (Chacko, Sjoman, Motohashi and 
Dessain 2006, p. 226) 
 
 The risk associated with mortgage-backed CDOs cannot possibly be priced correctly. 
Ratings agencies and the investment banks that create these securities rely on simulation models 
to assess their risk, but these models are unreliable and easily manipulated, and these institutions 
have strong incentives to produce unrealistically high ratings. The models are ‘black boxes’: data 
is fed in and millions of lines of computer code spit out a rating. It should come as no surprise 
that market operatives referred to the process through which investment banks and ratings 
agencies priced or marked CDOs as marking to ‘magic’ or to ‘myth.’ 
 The fact that neoclassical financial theory obviously cannot generate its signature 
optimality conclusion when no one knows the properties of a securitysomehow never came up in 
the deregulation debate.  
 
6. Concluding Thoughts 
 Many factors contributed to the recent financial crisis. Instability is built into capitalist 
financial markets, a historical fact incorporated in the financial market theories of Keynes, 
Minsky, Marx and others.21
                                                 
21 See Crotty 1985 for defense of the thesis that Marx’s theory of financial markets is similar to those of Keynes and 
Minsky.  
 In recent decades, financial innovation, perverse bonus-driven 
compensation systems, rising leverage and global integration led to reckless financial market 
expansion and excessive risk-taking that generated a series of dangerous financial crises. 
Government intervention to shorten and limit the depth of these crises in turn created moral 
hazard that induced even greater risk-taking that accelerated the long-term financial explosion. 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that radical financial market deregulation was a necessary 
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condition for the generation of a secular financial expansion this long and this strong, and for the 
creation of a global crisis as severe as one we are still living through.  
 So many powerful forces demanded deregulation in this period that it might have taken 
place even if the economics profession had adopted KM theory and spoken out forcefully against 
it. But had this happened, the deregulation process would have been much more difficult and the 
current crisis might have been much less destructive. The economics profession does bear some 
responsibility for the severity of the current crisis and the human suffering associated with it. In 
this essay I have argued that the profession’s support for deregulation is based on a misleading 
theory of financial markets constructed on obviously unrealistic assumptions and has little 
empirical support. As the world recently observed, predictions based on efficient financial 
market theory turned out to be catastrophically wrong. To take this theory seriously, one must 
accept Friedman’s positivist methodology because it asserts, against logic and common sense, 
that the realism of assumptions has no bearing on the validity of a theory, and that it is 
impossible to distinguish between realistic and non-realistic assumptions. Since neither of these 
propositions is true, economists should accept Keynes’s method, which asserts that realistic 
theories cannot be founded on crudely unrealistic assumptions, and reject all theories of perfect 
markets. As Harvard’s Dani Rodrik put it: “The idea that markets are self-correcting received a 
mortal blow in the recent financial crisis and should be buried once and for all” (Rodrik 2011). 
Until the profession rejects Friedman’s positivism and adopts some variant of the Keynes-
Minsky approach to theories of financial markets, policy makers should pay no attention to 
advice from the economics profession on matters of financial market regulation.    
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